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ABSTRACT 
 
In March 2018, Congress passed the Clarifying Lawful 
Overseas Use of Data Act, also known as the CLOUD Act, 
in order to expedite the process of cross-border data 
transfers for the purposes of criminal investigations. The 
U.S. government entered into its first Executive Agreement, 
the main tool to achieve the goals of the statute, with the 
United Kingdom in October 2019. While the CLOUD Act 
requires the U.S. Attorney General to consider whether the 
foreign government counterpart has a certain level of robust 
data privacy laws, the relevant laws of the United Kingdom 
have generally been questioned numerous times for their 
inadequacies in protecting privacy. Thus, the privacy of U.S. 
citizens may be in jeopardy under the new agreement. 
Although the texts of the CLOUD Act and the Executive 
Agreement clarify that the UK government cannot explicitly 
target the data of U.S. citizens, it does not guarantee that 
such information will not be gathered incidentally. First, the 
UK courts do not adhere to the equivalent level of probable 
cause standard that is demanded under the Fourth 
Amendment. Therefore, they may issue judicial orders to 
force the U.S.-based service providers to deliver certain 
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data, which may include information that belongs to the U.S. 
citizens, to the UK government upon finding mere possibility 
of relevance to the investigations. Coupled with this fact is 
arguably less robust privacy protection in the United 
Kingdom, from which it is not difficult to imagine a situation 
where the private information of U.S. citizens is extracted 
while the UK government seeks data belonging to citizens of 
its own. This Article argues that the threat to the data 
privacy of U.S. citizens via incidental collection is not only 
possible, but probable. At the same time, this Article 
explores possible solutions to fill in the identified gaps in the 
CLOUD Act that would enhance the protection of U.S. 
citizens’ data privacy from incidental collection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the emergence of cloud computing1 more than a decade 
ago, communications service providers have been storing 
consumers’ data on servers in different jurisdictions. 2  This is 
particularly a problem for law enforcement agencies when they need 
to extract relevant data from the service providers for the purpose of 
criminal investigations. For example, even if the U.S.-based service 
providers are under the jurisdiction of the U.S. government, for 
example, the data sought may be subject to the jurisdiction of 
another country due to the location of the server. In such cases, the 
agencies seeking data evidence will need to use “cross-border data 
access procedures” to obtain the data in question.3 If the laws of 
different countries regarding disclosure of such data conflict with 
each other, the communication service providers “may be forced to 
choose which country’s law to follow, knowing that they may face 
consequences for violating the other country’s laws.”4 
                                                 
1  See What is cloud computing?, MICROSOFT AZURE, 
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/what-is-cloud-computing/ (defining 
cloud computing as “the delivery of computing services—including servers, or 
storage, databases, networking, software, analytics, and intelligence—over the 
internet . . . to offer faster innovation, flexible resources, and economies of scale”) 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
2 Secil Bilgic, Something Old, Something New, and Something Moot: The 
Privacy Crisis Under the CLOUD Act, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 322 (2018) 
(“To achieve these benefits [of prevention of the loss of data due to computer 
crashes, less vulnerability to theft, and providing an easy medium to share files], 
cloud service providers move an individual’s data from one jurisdiction to 
another . . . .”). 
3 Id. at 323. 
4  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., WHITE PAPER ON PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY, 
PRIVACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD: THE PURPOSE AND 
IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, at 3 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1153436/download. 
3
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One of the main methods of data transfer for criminal 
investigation purposes is the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
(MLAT). 5  However, this method has often proven to be 
cumbersome and time-consuming to the detriment of timely 
prosecution of criminals in some cases.6 In March 2018, Congress 
passed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD 
Act) in order to expedite the process of cross-border data transfer 
for the purposes of criminal investigations.7 The statute attempts to 
achieve this by providing a legal basis for bilateral agreements 
between the U.S. government and a foreign government, which 
would allow for transfer of data while bypassing the requirements 
under an MLAT.  
Since the enactment of the CLOUD Act, scholars have focused 
on many aspects and potential effects of the statute: practical 
implementation of the statute in a world where data fragmentation 
is prevalent,8 data localization,9 encryption and decryption,10 and 
possible jurisdictional conflicts 11  as well as discussions on the 
CLOUD Act in regards to cybercrimes12. The statute was passed as 
part of an omnibus spending bill “with unusual speed and no 
debate.”13 Consequently, there has been much uncertainty as to how 
the statute will be applied in reality.14 For example, the CLOUD Act 
                                                 
5 See infra Section I.A.1. 
6  See Stephen P. Mulligan, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45173, CROSS-
BORDER DATA SHARING UNDER THE CLOUD ACT (2018). 
7 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, div. 5, 1213-25 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter CLOUD Act]. 
8 See generally Frederick T. Davis & Anna R. Gressel, Feature, Storm Clouds 
or Silver Linings? The Impact of the U.S. CLOUD Act, 45 LITIG. 47 (2018). 
9 See generally Shelli Gimelstein, A Location-Based Test for Jurisdiction 
Over Data: The Consequences for Global Online Privacy, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. 
& POL’Y 1 (2018). 
10 See generally Olivia Gonzalez, Cracks in the Armor: Legal Approaches to 
Encryption, 19 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1 (2019). 
11 See generally Sabrina A. Morris, Rethinking the Extraterritorial Scope of 
the United States’ Access to Data Stored by a Third Party, 42 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 183 (2018). 
12 See generally Chris Cook, Cross-Border Data Access and Active Cyber 
Defense: Assessing Legislative Options for a New International Cybersecurity 
Rulebook, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 205 (2018). 
13 Davis & Gressel, supra note 8, at 48. 
14 See generally Dechert LLP et al., Actual Impact of 2018 U.S. CLOUD Act 
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establishes certain requirements that a foreign government must 
satisfy in order to be eligible to form an executive agreement with 
the United States under the CLOUD Act, through which data 
transfer may be possible for criminal investigations.15 The statute, 
however, does not elaborate on how these factors—which include 
adequacy of laws and legal system in protecting fundamental human 
rights and civil rights, and against cybercrimes16—will come into 
play as the U.S. government considers a foreign government’s 
eligibility for an executive agreement.  
Indeed, privacy has also been at the heart of the conversation 
surrounding the new statute.17 One of the problems flagged shortly 
after its enactment was the possibility of incidental collection of data 
under the CLOUD Act.18 In the midst of reports from the European 
Data Protection Board and the Law Council of Australia indicating 
that the CLOUD Act would be incompatible with their equivalent 
laws, albeit for different reasons,19 the U.S. government entered into 
its first Executive Agreement under the CLOUD Act with the United 
Kingdom (Executive Agreement) in October 2019.20 In light of the 
newly signed Executive Agreement, this Article goes further by 
arguing that the threat to data privacy of U.S. citizens via incidental 
collection under the CLOUD Act is not only possible, but probable. 
                                                 
Still Hazy, JDSUPRA (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/actual-impact-of-2018-u-s-cloud-act-
85768/; see also Davis & Gressel, supra note 8, at 50 (stating that the CLOUD 
Act does not clarify whether it would apply to non-U.S. providers and that “the 
CLOUD Act does not fully address how these executive agreements will work in 
practice”).  
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b) (2018). 
16 See id. § 2523(b)(1)(B). 
17  See Bilgic, supra note 2 (discussing the privacy implications of the 
CLOUD Act for non-U.S. citizens). 
18 David Ruiz, A New Backdoor Around the Fourth Amendment: The CLOUD 
Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/new-backdoor-around-fourth-
amendment-cloud-act. 
19 See infra Section I.C. 
20 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. and UK Sign Landmark Cross-
Border Data Access Agreement to Combat Criminals and Terrorists Online (Oct. 
3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-and-uk-sign-landmark-cross-border-
data-access-agreement-combat-criminals-and-terrorists. 
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While the CLOUD Act requires the U.S. Attorney General to 
consider whether the foreign government counterpart has a certain 
level of robust data privacy laws,21 the relevant laws of the United 
Kingdom have been questioned numerous times for their 
inadequacies. 22  To be sure, the United Kingdom’s most recent 
surveillance law, the Investigatory Powers Act, includes judicial 
oversight23—an addition to its previous laws struck down by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and the UK courts. 24 
Nonetheless, there have been doubts that the new statute actually 
improved the protection of data privacy of the citizens.25 Indeed, the 
U.S. Attorney General has not provided  justifications as to how and 
why the United Kingdom satisfies the requirements under the 
CLOUD Act.  
Although the text of both the CLOUD Act and the Executive 
Agreement clarify that the UK government cannot explicitly target 
the data belonging to U.S. citizens,26 this does not guarantee that 
such data will not be gathered incidentally.27 The UK courts do not 
                                                 
21 The relevant part of the statute reads:  
“. . . an executive agreement governing access by a foreign government to 
data . . . shall be considered to satisfy the requirements of this section if the 
Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines. . . 
that— (1) the domestic law of the foreign government, including the 
implementation of that law, affords robust substantive and procedural protections 
for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data collection and activities of the 
foreign government that will be subject to the agreement. . .” 18 U.S.C. 
§2523(b)(1). 
22 See infra Section I.A.2. 
23  See Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA), c. 1, § 23-25 (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/contents. 
24 See infra Section I.A.2. 
25 See Scott Carey, The Snoopers’ Charter: Everything You Need to Know 
About the Investigatory Powers Act, COMPUTERWORLD (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3427019/the-snoopers-charter-
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-investigatory-powers-act.html.  
26  Under the CLOUD Act, “United States person” refers to “citizens or 
national of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for the permanent 
residence . . . or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence” for the purpose 
of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2523(a)(2). This Article uses the same definition when 
referring to “U.S. citizens.” 
27 For more information regarding incidental collection in the United States, 
see generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., Reducing “Incidental” Collection Under 
FISA Section 702: A Critical Protection for Americans (Oct. 2017), 
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need to adhere to an equivalent standard of probable cause 
demanded under the Fourth Amendment in ordering the U.S.-based 
service providers to deliver certain data—which may include 
information belonging to U.S. citizens—to the UK government.28 
This may allow the UK courts to force the transfer of data upon 
finding mere possibility of relevance to the investigations. Coupled 
with this fact is the arguably less robust privacy protection in the 
United Kingdom, 29  from which it is not difficult to imagine a 
situation where the data of U.S. citizens is extracted while the UK 
government seeks data of targeted UK citizens. 
To show that this potential for breach of data privacy of U.S. 
citizens is very real, this Article focuses on the United Kingdom’s 
invasive surveillance regime and its use of bulk data collection in 
conjunction with the lack of equivalent protection of privacy 
provided by the Fourth Amendment. These factors may allow 
incidental exposure of U.S. citizens’ private data to the UK 
government as the entity attempts to gather data of UK citizens 
under the Executive Agreement. 
By providing background information on the CLOUD Act, Part 
I argues that while Congress attempted to address one problem, the 
thinness of the solution—the CLOUD Act and the Executive 
Agreement—has opened doors for other issues. Part II argues that 
the possibility of breach of data privacy of U.S. citizens via 
incidental collection is real and probable under the UK surveillance 
regime without any Fourth Amendment protection. To facilitate the 
discussion, incidental collection under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) will be discussed because of the similarities 
between the provisions in FISA and the CLOUD Act as well as the 
Executive Agreement.30 Part III suggests recommendations that can 
enhance the protection of U.S. citizens’ data privacy by reinforcing 
                                                 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/FISASection702ReducingIncid
entalCollection.pdf. 
28 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, U.K.-
U.S., art. 5, Oct. 3, 2019, 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1207496/download [hereinafter U.S.-UK/Ir. 
Executive Agreement]; see also infra note 132. 
29 See infra Section I.A.2. 
30 See Ruiz, supra note 18. 
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the process of evaluating potential qualifying foreign governments 
under the CLOUD Act and increasing the role of the communication 
service providers.    
 
I. THE CLOUD ACT AND THE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT 
 
The inefficiencies of the current methods of cross-border data 
transfers and the gap in the relevant statutes—the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act 31  (ECPA) and the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) 32—in terms of their extraterritorial 
reach are the problems the CLOUD Act purported to solve.33 ECPA 
and the SCA, arguably outdated statutes, have been construed to 
have protection of privacy as their primary purposes, and, as 
discussed below, the Second Circuit ruled in accordance with that 
purpose in United States v. Microsoft.34 This Part argues that by 
effectively overruling the Circuit’s decision with the CLOUD Act, 
Congress considered data privacy to be of secondary importance 
compared to the facilitation of criminal investigations. And by 
attempting to solve the problems associated with cross-border data 
transfers, Congress opened doors to another problem: possibility of 
violation of U.S. citizens’ privacy. 
After briefly touching on the existing methods of transnational 
data transfers for criminal investigation purposes in Section I.A.1, 
Section I.A.2 discusses the background statutes that are in play: 
ECPA and the SCA. Section I.B.1 will explain the context in which 
extraterritorial application of the statutes became an issue before the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Microsoft,35 to which Congress 
responded by passing the CLOUD Act before the Court rendered an 
opinion as discussed in Section I.B.2. Next, initial assessment and 
review of the CLOUD Act by the European Data Protection Board 
and the Law Council of Australia is discussed in Section I.C to 
                                                 
31 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-23. 
32 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12. 
33 See infra Section I.B. 
34  See In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 829 F.3d 197, 219-20 (2d 
Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Microsoft Search Warrant Case]. 
35 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
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identify potential faults in the statute. Finally, Section I.D provides 
an overview of relevant terms of the Executive Agreement. 
 
A.  Existing Framework for Cross-Border Data Transfers 
  
The existing framework for cross-border data transfer for 
criminal investigation purposes are Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties and Letters Rogatory. The U.S. statutes that operate in the 
background are ECPA and the SCA. In essence, the courts consider 
these statutes when reviewing requests for data by other countries. 
 
1. MLAT and Letters Rogatory 
 
Prior to the enactment of the CLOUD Act, there were only two 
main (internationally established) mechanisms in which litigants in 
the United States could request data information located within the 
territorial jurisdiction of another country: the letters rogatory and the 
Mutual Legal Assistance process (MLA) based on MLAT.36 One of 
the criticisms for both methods is that the whole procedure takes too 
long.37 This is primarily due to the fact that the requests are given to 
the government of the receiving country—that is, the country that 
has jurisdiction over the location of the server holding the data in 
question—which will then go through additional procedures to 
safeguard against unlawful disclosure of private information.38 On 
average, it takes approximately 10 months for the United States to 
respond to an MLA request.39 Processing of the MLA requests sent 
                                                 
36 In civil cases, “non-government litigants who do not have access to the 
MLAT process” may use letters rogatory as a method to collect evidence from 
another country. T. Markus Funk, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters 
Rogatory: A Guide for Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., at 17 (2014), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/MLAT-LR-Guide-Funk-FJC-
2014.pdf. Letters rogatory and the MLAT process is not within the scope of this 
Article, and, thus, their procedures will not be discussed in detail. For more 
detailed discussion of the two methods and their procedures, see generally Funk, 
supra note 36; see also Mulligan, supra note 6. 
37 See Mulligan, supra note 6. 
38 See id. at 12. 
39 Richard A Clarke et al., Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report 
and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communications Technologies, at 227 (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-
9
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to another country by the U.S. government may take “considerably 
longer,” if it is ever completed.40 
 
2. ECPA and the SCA 
 
In 1986, Congress enacted ECPA, “one of the primary federal 
laws regulating disclosure of electronic communications.” 41  It 
protects any type of electronic communications—including emails, 
phone conversations, and data in general—that are made, 
transmitted, or stored.42 The more relevant chapter of ECPA is Title 
II of the statute: the SCA. The SCA “protects the privacy of the 
contents of files stored by service providers and of records held by 
the subscriber by service providers . . . .”43 It has been interpreted 
by the courts to apply to data associated with emails, 44  text 
messages,45 private messages, wall postings, and other comments 
made on or via social media sites,46  and even private YouTube 
videos.47 
Overall, the SCA has two major components. First, unless 
exceptions indicated apply, the communications service providers 
(“CSPs”) 48  are prohibited from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any 
                                                 
12_rg_final_report.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., supra note 4, at 2 (“Our 
foreign partners have long expressed concerns that the mutual legal assistance 
process is too cumbersome to handle their growing needs for this type of 
electronic evidence in a timely manner.”). 
40 Mulligan, supra note 6, at 14. 
41 Id. at 3. 
42  See Office of Just. Programs, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 
https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1285 (Apr. 23, 2019). 
43 Id. 
44 See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). 
45 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 
2008), rev’d on Fourth Amendment grounds sub nom. City of Ontario, Cal. v. 
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
46 See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980, 989 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
47 See Viacom Intern. Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
48 The SCA distinguishes between a person or entity “providing an electronic 
communication service to the public,” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1), and a person or 
entity “providing remote computing service to the public.” 18 U.S.C. § 
2702(a)(2). For the purpose of this Article, however, the difference is insignificant 
10
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person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic 
storage by that service” and “contents of any communication which 
is carried or maintained on that service.”49 Second, the SCA requires 
disclosure of such data to the U.S. government, under certain 
circumstances when a judicial warrant is successfully obtained.50 
While the SCA has been a major tool utilized by the U.S. 
government to obtain electronic evidence, the statute’s 
extraterritorial application became an issue in United States v. 
Microsoft.51 
 
B.  The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act 
 
The extraterritorial application of the SCA became an issue 
when Microsoft refused to hand over certain data that were stored in 
Ireland which the U.S. government sought as part of a criminal 
investigations. Section I.B.1 briefly discusses the history behind the 
enactment of the CLOUD Act, which shows that Congress indeed 
attempted to solve the core issue in Microsoft but did so in haste. 
The result is somewhat unclear languages within the new law, hence 
uncertainties introduced above and further analyzed in Section 
I.B.2.  
 
1. United States v. Microsoft Corp. 
In 2016, the U.S. government, in accordance with the SCA 
provisions, obtained a warrant from a magistrate judge requiring 
Microsoft to disclose relevant contents of an email account that was 
allegedly used by a suspect engaged in illegal drug trafficking.52 The 
                                                 
since, today, major CSPs provide both services. Thus, “CSPs” will refer to both 
types of providers in this Article. 
49 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The SCA requires the U.S. government to obtain a 
judicial warrant upon showing probable cause. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). However, 
it should be noted that there are many different factors to be considered, such as 
when and what the government can demand when it comes to communication data 
from the CSPs, which will not be discussed here. For detailed discussions about 
which factors that must be taken into account and specific procedures to be taken 
for such mandatory disclosure, see Mulligan, supra note 6, at 5-6. 
51 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
52 Id. at 1187. 
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warrant ordered Microsoft to disclose all relevant communication 
data “[t]o the extent that the information . . . is within [Microsoft’s] 
possession, custody, or control.” 53  While Microsoft partially 
complied by providing relevant data that was stored within the 
United States, it moved to quash the warrant with respect to the 
information stored in Ireland.54 After the magistrate judge denied 
the motion, the District Court affirmed the ruling.55 On appeal by 
the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed, holding that requiring Microsoft to disclose the electronic 
communications in a foreign territory would be an unauthorized 
extraterritorial application of § 2730 of the SCA.56 In concluding so, 
the Second Circuit also emphasized that legislative history suggests 
that the primary purpose of their enactment was the protection of 
data privacy, which trumps the investigatory needs of law 
enforcement. 57  The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari on 
October 16, 2017.58 The case drew public attention, and numerous 
amici briefs were submitted by “a range of groups including privacy 
advocates, law enforcement officials, members of Congress, 34 U.S. 
states and territories, and several foreign nations.”59 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 See Microsoft Search Warrant Case, at 200.  
55 Id. at 201. 
56 Id. at 222. 
57 Id. at 219-20 (“In enacting the SCA, Congress expressed a concern that 
developments in technology could erode the privacy interest that Americans 
traditionally enjoyed in their records and communications . . . . Accordingly, 
Congress set out to erect a set of statutory protections for stored electronic 
communications . . . . In regard to governmental access, Congress sought to ensure 
that the protections traditionally afforded by the Fourth Amendment extended to 
the electronic forum . . . . We believe this legislative history tends to confirm our 
view that the Act’s privacy provisions were its impetus and focus. Although 
Congress did not overlook law enforcement needs in formulating the statute, 
neither were those needs the primary motivator for the enactment . . . . Taken as 
a whole, the legislative history tends to confirm our view that the focus of the 
SCA’s warrant provisions is on protecting user’s privacy interests in stored 
communications.”) (emphasis added).  
58 Amy Howe, Court Adds Four New Cases to Merits Docket, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Oct. 16, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/court-adds-
four-new-cases-merits-docket/. 
59 Mulligan, supra note 6, at 7. 
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While the appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) sought action from Congress.60 In a 
hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary in June 2017, 
DOJ representatives argued that the Second Circuit’s decision 
curtailed law enforcement’s ability to obtain data stored by U.S.-
based CSPs abroad, which, consequently, causes harm to public 
safety.61  In February 2018, a bill titled the CLOUD Act, which 
“revised portions of the SCA to explicitly permit the use of warrant 
to obtain electronic communications stored by a U.S. company on 
foreign servers,”62  was introduced, passed in the House and the 
Senate, and signed into law by the President on March 23, 2018. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court rendered the Microsoft case 
moot.63 
 
2. Statutory Analysis of the CLOUD Act 
 
In April 2019, DOJ indicated that the purpose of the CLOUD 
Act was “to speed access to electronic information held by U.S. 
based global providers that is critical to our foreign partners’ 
investigations of serious crime” wherever the data server may be 
located.64 Mainly, the CLOUD Act has two critical implications. 
One, as mentioned above, the statute makes it explicit that the SCA 
will apply to content data in possession of the CSPs regardless of 
where the data server is located around the world.65 DOJ clarifies, 
                                                 
60 See Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection 
in the digital Era: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 
1 (2017) (statement of Richard W. Downing, Acting Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Just.), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20170615/106117/HHRG-115-JU00-
Wstate-DowningR-20170615.pdf. 
61 Id. 
62 Bilgic, supra note 2, at 332. The relevant statutory provision reads: “A 
[CSP] shall comply with the obligations of [the SCA] to preserve, backup, or 
disclose the contents of a wire or electronic communication and any record or 
other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber within such provider’s 
possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such communication, 
record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2713 (emphasis added). 
63 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018). 
64 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., supra note 4, at 2. 
65 Id. at 6 (“[T]he second part of the CLOUD Act clarifies that U.S. law 
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however, that the new “amendment . . . does not give U.S. law 
enforcement any new legal authority to acquire data . . . .”66 Rather, 
the amendment simply clarifies and confirms the extraterritorial 
scope of the SCA.67  
Two, the CLOUD Act authorizes the U.S. Attorney General, 
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to enter into 
executive bilateral agreements with other countries that would 
“remove restrictions under each country’s laws so that the CSPs can 
comply with qualifying, lawful orders for electronic data issued by 
the other country.” 68  In order to determine whether a foreign 
government is eligible to enter into an executive agreement with the 
U.S. government—or is a “qualifying foreign government” 69 
(QFG)—the CLOUD Act requires that the Attorney General 
consider different criteria and factors, such as implementation of 
robust substantive and procedural laws against cybercrimes; on 
electronic evidence; and on protection of privacy, civil liberties, and 
international human rights.70 
More relevant to this Article is the fact that a potential QFG must 
show commitment and respect for “international human rights, 
including . . . protection from arbitrary and unlawful interference 
with privacy” 71  and “sufficient mechanisms to provide 
accountability and appropriate transparency regarding the collection 
and use of electronic data.”72 These are precisely the areas in which 
the previous UK surveillance regime had been questioned and failed 
to prevail in judicial challenges.73 Moreover, a QFG must also have 
in place the procedures to “minimize the acquisition, retention, and 
                                                 
requires that CSPs subject to U.S. jurisdiction must disclose data that is responsive 
to valid U.S. legal process, regardless of where the company stores the data.”). 
66 Id. at 8. 
67 Id. See also Mulligan, supra note 6, at 8 (stating that DOJ’s proposal to 
Congress in the midst of the Microsoft case “was intended to restore the ‘pre-
Microsoft status quo when providers routinely complied’ with the SCA warrants 
for data stored abroad.”). 
68 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., supra note 4, at 3. 
69 Bilgic, supra note 2, at 336. 
70 See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b). 
71 Id. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). 
72 Id. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(v). 
73 See infra Section II.A.2. 
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dissemination of information concerning United States persons.”74 
For one, it is unclear how the United Kingdom has established such 
system, and, thus, satisfies this category in the eyes of the U.S. 
Attorney General. But even if the country has successfully put such 
a system in place, discussion of incidental collection under FISA, 
which compels the U.S. law enforcement agencies to do the same, 
shows that this may not be enough to protect the data privacy of U.S. 
citizens.75 
There are also limitations outlined in the CLOUD Act for a QFG. 
In general, the statute does not create any obligation for the CSPs to 
decrypt any encrypted data transmitted to the QFG, or even to retain 
the technology to do so.76 The CLOUD Act also amends the original 
text of 18 U.S.C. § 2703 by allowing the CSPs that have been issued 
a judicial order forcing them to hand over certain data to make 
Motions to Quash or Modify the court order.77 In order to succeed 
in such motions in the United States, the CSPs must conjunctively 
establish that the targeted person is a non-U.S. person who does not 
reside in the United States, and that the disclosure would violate the 
national laws of the QFG.78 The courts may modify or quash the 
motion only if that they believe that the motion should be granted in 
consideration of interests of justice in totality of the circumstances, 
in addition to finding that the CSPs have satisfied its burden of 
proof.79 However, the courts may still force immediate production 
of requested data while the order is being challenged if the delay 
would cause an “adverse result identified in Section 2705(a)(2).”80 
Other limitations are similar, if not almost identical, to 
provisions in FISA. For instance, the QFG may not intentionally 
seek or obtain data of U.S. citizens and persons located within the 
U.S. borders, or achieve this by targeting a foreigner located outside 
                                                 
74 Id. § 2523(b)(2). 
75 See infra Section II.A.1. 
76 Id. § 2523(b)(3). 
77 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2)(A).  
78 Id. § 2703(h)(2)(B). It should be noted that the CLOUD Act itself only 
seem to specify the procedures and the standards applicable in the U.S. courts but 
not the courts of the QFGs. See infra note 229. 
79 The CLOUD Act dictates that the court considering such Motion to Quash 
or Modify should consider international comity among other elements. See id. § 
2703(h)(3). 
80 Id. § 2703(h)(4). 
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the United States.81 Furthermore, the order issued by a QFG must be 
solely to obtain data related to a serious crime.82 The court orders 
must be subject to review by an independent judicial or another 
authority,83 and abide by other restrictions on wire tapping similar 
to those under FISA. 84 The QFG may not issue an order on behalf 
of the United States for data disclosure nor “be required to share any 
information produced with the United States Government.”85 
 
C.  Assessment of the CLOUD Act by Foreign Authorities 
While there have been many speculations on the practicality of 
the CLOUD Act for some time after its enactment, the European 
Data Protection Board (EDPB) of the European Union (EU) and the 
Law Council of Australia (LCA) presented clarifying views on the 
CLOUD Act’s compatibility with their own respective equivalent 
laws. Simply put, the requirements under the CLOUD Act are “too 
hard” in comparison to the Australian law and “too soft” for the 
EU.86 The compatibility assessment against the laws of the EU and 
Australia will be discussed for the purpose of showing the thinness 
of the CLOUD Act—a product of Congress’ rush to answer the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Microsoft. 
 
                                                 
81 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(A), (B). 
82 Id. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(i). 
83 Id. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(v). 
84  See id. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(vi) (“[A]n order [issued by the QFG] for the 
interception of wire or electronic communications . . . shall require that the 
interception order . . . be for a fixed, limited duration . . . , may not last longer than 
is reasonably necessary to accomplish the approved purpose of the order . . . , and 
be issued only if the same information could not reasonably be obtained by 
another less intrusive method.”). Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (specifying the 
requirements, as to duration, for example, to be met for a court order under FISA).  
85 Id. § 2523(b)(4)(C). 
86 Marcus Evans et al., US Cloud Act and International Privacy, NORTON 
ROSE FULBRIGHT: DATA PROTECTION REP. (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2019/08/u-s-cloud-act-and-international-
privacy/. 
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1. The European Union and the GDPR 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU 
became binding on all member states as of May 25, 2018.87 Written 
by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, the GDPR 
was implemented “not only to enhance and safeguard the rights that 
individuals have over their data but . . . to create a simple and 
efficient regulatory environment, where compliance with the 
regulation is a key element, not only for public sector, but also for 
private businesses.”88 
On July 10, 2019, the EDPB and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) issued an initial assessment of the CLOUD Act 
in relation to the GDPR.89 They concluded that a U.S.-based CSP 
active in the European market would not be able to transfer data to 
the U.S. government under the CLOUD Act without violating the 
GDPR. 90  The main obstacle, the two entities claim, is the 
incompatibility between the requests under the CLOUD Act and 
Articles 6, 48, and 49 of the GDPR.91 
                                                 
87 Directive 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 
27, 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 
95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1528874672298&uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679 
[hereinafter GDPR]. 
88 Georgios Roussaris, EU Policies in Data Governance: The New Challenge 
on the Field of Public Administration, at 26 (2019), 
https://dspace.lib.uom.gr/bitstream/2159/23080/4/RoussarisGeorgiosMsc2019.p
df.; see also Data Governance: Landscape Review, THE ROYAL SOCIETY, at 9 
(June 2017), https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/data-
governance/data-governance-landscape-review.pdf. 
89  See European Data Protection Board (EDPB), ANNEX. Initial Legal 
Assessment of the Impact of the US CLOUD Act on the EU Legal Framework for 
the Protection of Personal Data and the Negotiations of an EU-US Agreement on 
Cross-border Access to Electronic Evidence (July 10, 2019), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file2/edpb_edps_joint_response_us_
cloudact_annex.pdf. 
90 Id.  
91  It should be noted that the EDPB stated that there may be certain 
exceptions. See id. n.18 (“The European Commission takes the view that some 
derogations under Article 49 GDPR might be used, depending on the 
circumstances of the case.”). 
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First, Article 48 of the GDPR requires that a judicial or an 
administrative order requesting disclosure of personal data from a 
CSP within the EU “may only be recognized or enforceable in any 
manner if based on an international agreement.”92 Since executive 
agreements under the CLOUD Act are not treated as such 
international agreement by the EU,93 the CSPs will not be able to 
transfer personal data to the U.S. government under the CLOUD Act 
without violating Article 48, unless there is “another legal basis 
under the GDPR.”94  
Second, Article 6(1)(c) requires that the data transfer be 
“necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the [CSP] 
is subject.”95 However, because “legal obligation” in this context 
can only have basis under the law of the EU or the Member States,96 
a CLOUD Act-based request would create legal obligations for a 
CSP only if the EU enters into a separate international agreement 
with the United States under Article 48. 97  Neither would such 
request have legal basis under Article 6(1)(e) 98  for the same 
reasons.99 Additionally, although Article 6(1)(d) may allow transfer 
of personal data “in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject or of another natural person,”100 the GDPR states that the 
transfers for the latter purpose should take place only when there is 
no other legal basis for doing so. 101  Consequently, while data 
                                                 
92 GDPR, art. 48.  
93 While Article 48 of the GDPR explicitly states that an MLAT between the 
EU and another country will suffice, it seems that an executive agreement with 
the United States under the CLOUD Act will not be treated as an “international 
agreement” under Article 48. See EDPB, supra note 89, at 3. 
94 Id. 
95 GDPR, art. 6(1)(c). 
96 Id. art. 6(3). 
97 See EDPB, supra note 89, at 4. 
98 See GDPR, art. 6(1)(e) (“Processing shall be lawful only if . . . processing 
is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in 
the exercise of official authority vested in the controller.”). 
99 See EDPB, supra note 89, at 4-5 (“We consider that Article 6(1)(e) may 
not constitute a valid legal basis [because] where processing is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority, according to Article 6(3) GDPR, the processing should have basis in 
Union or Member State law.”). 
100 GDPR, art. 6(1)(d). 
101 See GDPR, recital 46. (“Processing of personal data based on vital interest 
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transfer may be lawful if its purpose was to protect the vital interest 
of the data subject, the same cannot be said for “another natural 
person” because the EU-US MLAT is a valid alternative legal basis 
for requesting such information.102 Lastly, data transfers may be 
lawful under Article 6(1)(f)103 only if the legitimate interests of the 
CSPs or those of the U.S. government outweigh the interests or 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.104 In evaluating 
the balancing test, the EDPB and the EDPS clarify that the U.S. 
government is “not [one of the] public or competent authorities 
established under EU Law,” and, thus, cannot fall within the 
definition of “third party” for the purposes of Article 6(1)(f); the 
latter element of the balancing test will likely override the former 
due to potential violation of data subject’s right to effective remedy, 
the principle of dual criminality, and circumstances in which the 
CSPs will need to act on the basis of limited information.105 
Finally, the EDPB and the EDPS discussed whether disclosure 
of data under the CLOUD Act would be compatible under Article 
49: Derogations for Specific Situations.106 They answered in the 
negative. The legality of such transfer under Article 49(1)(d)107 is 
rejected because “only public interests recognised in Union law or 
in the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject can 
lead to the application of this derogation,” and that of the United 
States is not relevant.108 It is conceded that data transfer may be 
lawful under Article 49(1)(e) 109  under certain circumstances. 110 
                                                 
of another natural person should in principle take place only where the processing 
cannot be manifestly based on another legal basis.”). 
102 See EDPB, supra note 89. 
103 See GDPR, art. 6(1)(f) (“Processing shall be lawful only if . . . processing 
is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller 
or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of 
personal data.”). 
104 See EDPB, supra note 89, at 5. 
105 Id. at 5-6. 
106 GDPR, art. 49. 
107 Id. art. 49(1)(d) (“. . . the transfer is necessary for important reasons of 
public interest . . .”). 
108 See EDPB, supra note 89, at 6. 
109 See GDPR, art. 49(1)(e) (“. . . transfer is necessary for the establishment, 
exercise or defense of legal claims . . .”). 
110 See EDPB, supra note 89, at 6. 
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However, “a close link is necessary between the data transfer and a 
specific procedure . . . and the derogation cannot be used to justify 
the [data] transfer . . . on the grounds of the mere possibility that 
legal proceedings may be brought in the future.” 111  Likewise, 
possibility of data transfer under Article 49(1)(f) is also dismissed 
under the same reasoning mentioned above for Article 6(1)(d).112 
Lastly, the EDPB and the EDPS declared that the last paragraph of 
Article 49(1) “cannot provide a valid lawful ground to transfer 
personal data on the basis of [the] US CLOUD Act requests” mainly 
because, in addition to the balancing test imposed under Article 
6(1)(f), the CSPs who are transferring the data must “notify both the 
supervisory authority and the data subject[, which] appears 
incompatible with ‘protective orders’ often joined to [the] US 
CLOUD Act warrants, which aim at maintaining the secrecy of the 
request (in order to avoid compromising the investigation).”113 
 
2. Australia and the Assistance and Access Act 
 
On December 9, 2018, the Australian government enacted a new 
legislation—the Assistance and Access Act (AAA) 114 —“to 
facilitate law enforcement access to data” and address problems 
associated with “cross-nature of investigations involving digital 
evidence.” 115  The relevant provisions “specif[y] in detail the 
                                                 
111 Id. at 6-7. 
112 See GDPR, art. 49(1)(f) (“In the absence of an adequacy decision [or of 
appropriate safeguards], a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third 
country or an international organisation shall take place only on one of the 
following conditions . . . (f) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital 
interests of the data subject or of other persons, where the data subject is 
physically or legally incapable of giving consent.”).  
The EDPB and EDPS clarifies that the “circumstance that data subjects 
should be physically or legally incapable of giving consent . . . may not exclude 
situations where the data subject is constituting an imminent threat to the life and 
physical integrity of other persons, providing that sufficient information is 
provided to establish the validity of transfer in such circumstances.” EDPB, supra 
note 89, at 7. 
113 See EDPB, supra note 89, at 7. 
114  See Assistance and Access Act 2018 (Cth) ss 43A, 43B (Austl.), 
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r6195_aspassed/t
oc_pdf/18204b01.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. 
115 Jennifer Daskal, Privacy and Security Across Borders, 128 YALE L.J. 1029, 
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requirements that apply if and when the government . . . accesses a 
computer or data known to be located across borders.”116 
The LCA identified three issues with the CLOUD Act, two of 
which seem to be more problematic and, thus, may prevent Australia 
from entering into an executive agreement with the United States 
under the CLOUD Act: (1) the lack of the enforcement of decryption 
on the CSPs, and (2) the requirement of review or oversight by the 
judicial or other independent authority. 117  More specifically, the 
CLOUD Act makes clear that the executive agreements cannot 
enforce an obligation on a CSP capable of decrypting data to do 
so. 118  But the AAA allows the Australian law enforcements to 
require the CSPs to decrypt private communications for criminal 
investigation purposes in certain situations.119 In regards to the other 
incompatibility, the order issued by the QFG under the CLOUD Act 
must be “subject to review or oversight by a court, judge, magistrate, 
or other independent authority prior to, or in proceedings regarding, 
enforcement of the order.”120 However, the AAA “does not provide 
sufficient requirements for the independent judicial oversight” of the 
issuance of such orders.121 
                                                 
1031 (2018-2019). 
116 Id. 
117 See Law Council of Australia (LCA), Review of the amendments made by 
the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and 
Access) Act 2018 (Cth), 8 (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/docs/e3857998-50d8-e911-9400-
005056be13b5/3646%20-
%20Review%20of%20the%20amendments%20made%20by%20the%20Assista
nce%20and%20Access%20Act.pdf. 
118 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(3) (“[T]he terms of the [executive] agreement shall 
not create any obligation that providers be capable of decryption data or limitation 
that prevents providers from decrypting data.”). 
119  See Explanatory Memorandum, Telecommunications and Other 
Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Cth) (Austl.), 
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r6195_ems_1139b
fde-17f3-4538-b2b2-
5875f5881239/upload_pdf/685255.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. 
120 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(v). 
121 LCA, supra note 117, at 9. The Law Council of Australia notes that while 
the Technical Assistance Notices (TAN) and Technical Capability Notices 
(TCN)—which are equivalent of orders—require supervision of the Attorney 
General, the Attorney General is not an independent party as a member of the 
Executive Branch. For detailed discussions of TAN and TCN, see Law Council 
21
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Thus, the LCA, in its submission to the Australian Parliament, 
concluded that Australia, with its current legislation, will not qualify 
for an executive agreement with the United States under the 
CLOUD Act.122 To be sure, these are incompatibilities under the 
current laws as they stand. That is to say, both parties will be able to 
agree on modified terms in an executive agreement. As of October 
7, 2019, the United States and Australia have released a joint 
statement indicating that negotiations under the CLOUD Act are 
underway.123 
 
D.  U.S.-UK Executive Agreement of 2019 
 
On the other hand, the United Kingdom has been a fervent 
supporter of the CLOUD Act, and it came with no surprise that it 
was the first country to have entered into an Executive Agreement 
under the statute.124 In fact, the two countries had been negotiating 
a similar agreement even before the CLOUD Act was signed into 
law.125 Section I.D.1 will briefly touch on the terms of the Executive 
Agreement that are relevant for the purposes of this Article. 
 
                                                 
of Australia, Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance 
and Access) Bill 2018 (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/docs/508b2589-9ed2-e811-93fc-
005056be13b5/3530%20-
%20Telecommunications%20and%20Other%20Legislation%20Amendment%2
0Assistance%20and%20Access%20Bill%202018.pdf. 
122 See LCA, supra note 117, at 8. 
123 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Joint Statement Announcing United 
States and Australian Negotiation of a CLOUD Act Agreement by U.S. Attorney 
General William Barr and Minister for Home Affairs Peter Dutton (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-announcing-united-states-and-
australian-negotiation-cloud-act-agreement-us. 
124 Drew Mitnick, What Happened with the CLOUD Act (and What Comes 
Next), ACCESS NOW (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.accessnow.org/what-
happened-with-the-cloud-act-and-what-comes-next/ (“The first country that the 
U.S. will likely reach an agreement with is the United Kingdom . . .”). 
125 See Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, The British Wants to Come to 
America – with Wiretap Orders and Search Warrants, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-british-
want-to-come-to-america--with-wiretap-orders-and-search-
warrants/2016/02/04/b351ce9e-ca86-11e5-a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html. 
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1. Relevant Sections of the Executive Agreement 
 
DOJ emphasized that the Executive Agreement was recognized 
as necessary by both parties in order to fight “serious crimes.”126 
The Executive Agreement is to be entered into force after a 180-day 
Congressional review period as required by the CLOUD Act.127  
First, Article 1(16) limits the scope of the application of the 
Agreement to data that are used or controlled by a “Covered Person” 
but not by any “Receiving Party.”128 Article 1(12) clarifies that a 
“Receiving Party Person” is essentially a citizen, a permanent 
resident, or a government official of the United States129 or that of 
the United Kingdom, or a corporation or any other person within the 
United Kingdom.130 These two articles imply that the Executive 
Agreement, on its face, does not authorize the UK government to 
gather information involving U.S. citizens, either directly or 
indirectly. 
When the UK or the U.S. government issues an order requesting 
relevant data from the CSPs within their jurisdictions, only their 
respective domestic laws apply.131 This means that no laws of the 
United States will be relevant or applicable to the UK government’s 
request for information from the U.S.-based CSPs within its borders.  
Article 5 of the Agreement speaks to the requirement of 
“reasonable justification” in issuance of the orders and their judicial 
oversight by the UK courts.132 Article 5(4) does not allow for orders 
that are issued for the purpose of disclosing information to the U.S. 
or a third-party government.133  Articles 5(11), (12) elaborate on 
procedures through which the CSPs may object to such orders if 
they believe the order is inappropriate.134 Essentially, a CSP may 
                                                 
126 U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 20 (“Attorney General William Barr said: 
“This agreement will enhance the ability of the United States and the United 
Kingdom to fight serious crime—including terrorism, transnational organized 
crime, and child exploitation . . . .”). 
127 See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)(4). But see infra note 235. 
128 See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28. 
129 Id. art. 1(16). 
130 Id. art. 1(12). 
131 Id. art. 3(2). 
132 Id. art. 5(1), (2). 
133 Id. art. 5(4). 
134 Id. art. 5(11), (12). See also infra notes 228-231 and accompanying texts. 
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object to the UK government’s order, and if the two parties cannot 
resolve the issue, then the U.S. government will step in to evaluate 
the appropriateness of the order. If the U.S. government agrees with 
the objecting CSP, then the latter party will have no obligation to 
disclose any information to the UK government. 
The most relevant part of the Agreement is Article 7: Targeting 
and Minimization Procedures, which takes a similar form of § 702 
of FISA.135 Article 7 requires the United Kingdom to “adopt and 
implement appropriate procedures to minimize” incidentally 
obtaining data of U.S. citizens while collecting data of a target 
person under its judicial order, i.e., incidental collection of such data. 
Article 7(3) requires the UK government to “segregate, seal, or 
delete, and not disseminate” such data that is not necessary to the 
criminal investigation and prosecution of the “Covered Person.”136  
Putting aside the difficulty of segregating data in general, the 
agreement does not elaborate on what constitutes “necessary,” 
which is left for interpretation by the UK government. Article 7(5) 
requires that such data not be transmitted to the U.S. government 
unless it “relates to significant harm [or] threat to the United 
States.”137 Again, the Executive Agreement does not go far enough 
to define the extents of “relates” and “significant harm.” However, 
the existence of Article 7(5) indicates that both parties recognize that 
the possibility of incidental collection of data is real and high, if not 
inevitable. 
Lastly, according to the Executive Agreement, the United 
Kingdom does not require permission to use data obtained unless it 
raises freedom of speech concerns, and the United States needs to 
seek permission from the UK government only if the data obtained 
from a CSP server in the United Kingdom would be used for an 
offense that may result in the death penalty.138 
 
                                                 
135 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h); see also infra notes 144-147 and accompanying 
text. 
136 See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 7(3). 
137 Id. art. 7(5). 
138 Id. art. 8(4). 
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II. POTENTIAL JEOPARDY TO THE DATA PRIVACY OF U.S. CITIZENS 
 
Having been enacted as part of an omnibus spending bill with 
haste,139 the CLOUD Act includes gaps, some of which have been 
identified by foreign entities in Section I.C. Given the transnational 
nature of cross-border data transfers, the statute should have 
included details that would fill in such cracks. While the Executive 
Agreement does include terms that attempt to make whole the 
deficiencies, it does not provide adequate protection against 
incidental data collection. Part II argues that the possibility of 
incidental collection of data belonging to U.S. citizens is at least 
probable, if not certain. Section II.A, using FISA as a vehicle, 
identifies ways in which this could happen under the Executive 
Agreement. Section II.B discusses how this could happen under the 
UK laws that are arguably less than adequate to protect data privacy 
of individuals. 
 
A.  Incidental Collection of Data of Non-target Citizens 
 
Incidental collection of data refers to the collection of data 
belonging to those who are not the target of criminal 
investigations.140 For example, if the government is seeking private 
data of Citizen A—the target—and such data includes conversations 
between A and B, then data of B may be “incidentally” collected 
during the evidence gathering. Then, the data belonging to B would 
be entered into the database of the governmental organizations who 
are free to search within the database as long as any data sought is 
related to the investigation.141  
Such incidental collection is nothing new. In fact, the 
government’s recognition of its possibility is reflected in many 
regulations, including FISA and the CLOUD Act as well as the 
Executive Agreement. 142  More specifically, this is shown in §§ 
2523(b)(2), (b)(4)(D)(vi)(G) and (H), as amended by the CLOUD 
Act, and Article 7 of the Executive Agreement which is written 
                                                 
139 See Davis & Gressel, supra note 8. 
140 See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 27. 
141 Id.  
142 See infra note 143. 
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almost in verbatim.143 In Section II.A.1, FISA will be discussed 
because it illustrates the authorities given to governmental agencies 
that lead to incidental collections. The statute also includes 
provisions and structures that parallel those of the CLOUD Act and 
the Executive Agreement. Section II.A.2 provides a brief overview 
of the history of the UK surveillance laws that led to the current 
Investigatory Powers Act, which serves as the legal basis for the 
Executive Agreement for the European country. 
 
1. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
 
As amended in 2008, § 702 of FISA authorizes the U.S. 
government to collect electronic communications of foreigners 
located outside of the United States from the CSPs if the data is 
related to national security or other serious crimes. 144  However, 
FISA mandates that data acquisition under § 702 must be consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment, and forbids the U.S. government from 
                                                 
143  § 2523(b)(2) requires that a qualifying foreign government to have 
“adopted appropriate procedures to minimize the acquisition, retention, and 
dissemination of information concerning United States persons subject to the 
agreement.”  
Additionally, § 2523(b)(4)(D)(vi)(G) requires the foreign government, 
“using procedures that, to the maximum extent possible, meet the definition of 
minimization procedures in Section 101 of [FISA], segregate, seal, or delete, and 
no disseminate material found not to be information that is, or is necessary to 
understand or assess the importance of information that is, relevant to the 
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of serious crime, including 
terrorism, or necessary to protect against a threat of death or serious bodily injury 
harm to any person.”  
Finally, § 2523(b)(4)(D)(vi)(H) states that the qualifying foreign government 
“may not disseminate the content of a communication of a United States person 
to United States authorities unless the communication may be disseminated 
pursuant to subparagraph (G) and relates to significant harm, or the threat thereof, 
to the United States or United States persons including crimes involving national 
security such as terrorism significant violent crime, child exploitation 
transnational organized crime, or significant financial fraud.”  
Indeed, the U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement includes similar languages. 
See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28; see also infra notes 144-
147 and accompanying texts. 
144 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 § 
702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2008) [hereinafter FISA]. 
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intentionally targeting data that belongs to U.S. citizens.145 FISA 
also includes a provision on “minimization procedures” which is 
aimed to curtail the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of data 
of U.S. citizens that are collected unintentionally—or 
incidentally.146 If collected, data of U.S. citizens may not be used in 
criminal proceedings unless certain exceptions apply.147  
Many FISA provisions are similar to those in the CLOUD Act 
as well as the Executive Agreement. Some distinctions are just as 
apparent, however. For one, under FISA, initial certification 
submitted by the Attorney General for collection of data under § 702 
is subject to review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) to ensure that the certification is consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. 148  On the other hand, the CLOUD Act and the 
Executive Agreement only require that the judicial order of the UK 
courts reflect “reasonable justification” based on the facts presented 
to them.149 
Incidental collection can happen in two ways under § 702: 
downstream collection and upstream collection. Downstream 
collection, also known as the PRISM program, is when government 
agencies collect data from the CSPs if “communications contain 
certain terms chosen by the [National Security Agency].” 150 
Upstream collection refers to massive data gathering by the National 
Security Agency directly from the internet which are transmitted 
through “domestic and international fiber optic cables.” 151  This 
method allows for bulk data collection by the agency which may 
contain communications data of those other than the targeted 
                                                 
145 See id. § 1881a(b). 
146 See id. § 1801(h). 
147  The use of incidentally collected data of U.S. citizens in criminal 
proceedings, while is an important issue, is beyond the scope of this paper, which 
is merely exploring the problems of similar collection in order to parallel the 
problem in the circumstances of the UK. For statutory language on how such data 
may be used in criminal proceedings, see id. § 1806.  
148 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)(2)(A), (b). 
149 See supra, note 132. 
150 Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Transatlantic Flow of Data and the National 
Security Exception in the European Data Privacy Regulation: In Search for Legal 
Protection Against Surveillance, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L., 459, 462-463 (2014). 
151 Id. at 463. 
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persons. 152  Collected data is entered into a database routinely 
searched by government entities.153  The agencies do not need a 
warrant to search the existing database, a practice is coined as 
“backdoor searches”154 since they would need to show probable 
cause otherwise.155 
Incidental collection of bulk data belonging to U.S. citizens 
under FISA is an ongoing problem. On October 18, 2019, the FISC 
released an opinion on the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)’s 
use of its authority under § 702.156 The opinion shows that such 
incidental collection is not-so incidental. In sum, the court found that 
the “querying procedures and minimization procedures [of the FBI] 
do not comply with the requirement at Section 702(f)(1)(B) [and] to 
be inconsistent with statutory minimization requirements and the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment,” particularly in relation to 
the use of backdoor searches.157 Thus, even with the safeguards of 
annual judicial review and attempts to enforce the probable cause 
standard, the data of U.S. citizens has not been adequately protected 
by, but rather been exposed to, the U.S. government. Nonetheless, 
the FISC approved the data collection certification of the FBI in 
question, after the latter submitted amended certifications to explain 
why they are acquiring certain data.158 
                                                 
152  Sneha Indrajit et al., FISA’s Section 702 & the Privacy Conundrum: 
Surveillance in the U.S. and Globally, THE HENRY M. JACKSON SCH. OF INT’L 
STUD. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://jsis.washington.edu/news/controversy-
comparisons-data-collection-fisas-section-702/. 
153  Backdoor Search, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/pages/backdoor-search.  
154 Id. 
155 Brittany Adams, Striking a Balance: Privacy and National Security in 
Section 702 U.S Person Queries, 94 WASH. L. REV. 401, 404 (2019). 
156  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Documents Regarding the 
Section 702 2018 Certification (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/
2018_Cert_FISC_Opin_18Oct18.pdf. 
157 Id. 
158 Aaron Mackey & Andrew Crocker, Secret Court Rules that the FBI’s 
“Backdoor Searches” of Americans Violated the Fourth Amendment, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/10/secret-court-rules-fbis-backdoor-
searches-americans-violated-fourth-amendment. 
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Seeing as how even the Fourth Amendment does not seem to 
provide enough protection to data privacy, it is easy to imagine a 
situation where with a lesser stringent standard, violation of privacy 
rights may happen in a more consistent basis. This has been the key 
controversy surrounding the surveillance laws of the United 
Kingdom. 
 
2. UK Public Surveillance Laws  
 
The UK government has had its public surveillance laws 
challenged on numerous occasions. The UK surveillance regime has 
its roots in § 94 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984, which gave 
the government the authority to force communications providers to 
retain and provide relevant data.159 This power had been used for 
decades by the government to collect data in bulk without any 
independent oversight.160 A similar tool used by the UK government 
is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA), 
which authorized the government to collect certain types of private 
communication data without judicial oversight.161 The product of 
the government’s effort to supplement RIPA was the Data Retention 
and Investigatory Powers Act of 2014 (DRIPA). 162  DRIPA 
authorized the UK Secretary of State to compel communications 
providers to retain data for any purpose in relation to §22(2) of 
                                                 
159 Telecommunications Act 1984, §§ 94(1), (2), (Eng.). 
160 Alan Travis et al., Theresa May Unveils UK Surveillance Measures in 
Wake of Snowden Claims, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/theresa-may-surveillance-
measures-edward-snowden. 
161  Rubin S. Waranch, Digital Rights Ireland Deja Vu?: Why the Bulk 
Acquisition Warrant Provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 Are 
Incompatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 50 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 209, 215 (2017); see also Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000, c. 23 (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/pdfs/ukpga_20000023_en.pdf. 
162 See State Surveillance and Data Privacy: What Now?, EACHOTHER (Sept. 
21, 2018), https://eachother.org.uk/state-surveillance-what-now/ (explaining that 
DRIPA was passed after failed attempt by Home Secretary Theresa May to 
introduce the Communications Data Bill that would “grant[] even wider 
surveillance powers” than RIPA, a seemingly outdated law in light of recent 
digital advancements). 
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RIPA.163 After its expiration, DRIPA was struck down by the UK 
Court of Appeals, following the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU)’s judgement against it because of its inconsistencies 
with the data retention laws of the EU and for the lack of 
independent oversight. 164  For similar reasons, the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal165 ruled that data collection implemented by the 
government under DRIPA was not compatible with Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which includes provisions 
of individual’s fundamental right to protection of privacy.166  
The most recent statute that grants the UK government similar, 
and arguably more expansive, authority to seek citizens’ data for 
national security purposes is the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA), 
passed in 2016.167 At the time of enactment, the IPA authorized 
governmental agencies to collect bulk of communications data, 
rather than only those of targeted individuals, upon approval by the 
Secretary of State. 168  The IPA went through some amending in 
2018, during which the government conceded that DRIPA was 
inconsistent with the EU law because not all of the data retained was 
for the purpose of fighting “serious crime,” their collection was not 
subject to review by independent body, and the IPA originally had 
provisions taken from DRIPA.169 As amended, the IPA includes 
                                                 
163 See Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, c. 27, § 1(1), 
(Eng.). 
164 Matt Burgess, The UK’s Mass Surveillance Laws Just Suffered Another 
Hefty Blow, WIRED (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-
surveillance-unlawful-watson-davis. 
165 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, established in 2000 as an independent 
judicial tribunal under RIPA, is the equivalent of the FISC in the United States. 
See General Overview and Background, THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIB. 
(July 5, 2016), https://www.ipt-uk.com/content.asp?id=10. However, the 
Tribunal will not be discussed at length because, as of this writing, much of its 
role has been transferred to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office 
created by the more recent Investigatory Powers Act. See Who We Are, 
INVESTIGATORY POWERS COMM’R’S OFF., https://www.ipco.org.uk/. 
166 Privacy Int’l v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2016] IPT 15, 110-CH (Eng.), https://www.ipt-
uk.com/docs/Bulk_Data_Judgment.pdf; see also Matt Burgess, MI6, MI5 and 
GCHQ ‘Unlawfully Collected Private Data for 10 Years’, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-collect-data-unlawful. 
167 See IPA, supra note 23. 
168 See Waranch, supra note 161, at 227. 
169 Ian Cobain, UK Has Six Months to Rewrite Snooper’s Charter, High Court 
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definitions of “serious crimes” 170  and created the Investigatory 
Powers Commission (IPC)—a group of judges who provide 
independent oversight of the process.171 As of this writing, several 
challenges to the IPA have not been successful in the UK Courts.172 
 
B.  Incidental Collection under the Executive Agreement 
 
As mentioned above, governments themselves recognize that 
incidental collection of non-target citizens is probable, if not 
inevitable. FISA elaborates on minimization procedures to ensure 
that incidentally collected data of U.S. citizens are not abused.173 
Likewise, the Executive Agreement includes provisions that the UK 
government must abide by if data of U.S. citizens are incidentally 
collected. More specifically, in regards to such data, the UK 
government must evaluate whether the data is imperative to the 
investigation and must destroy the data if not, and cannot hand over 
such data to the U.S. government unless it is related to national 
security of the United States.174 However, the IPA may create ways 
in which the UK government not only collect but retain data that 
belongs to U.S. citizens. This Section identifies two issues: the 
limited oversight of bulk collection of data and the lack of probable 
cause standard in the United Kingdom. 
 
                                                 
Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/27/snoopers-charter-
investigatory-powers-act-rewrite-high-court-rules. 
170 The IPA defines “serious crime” as “offence, or one of the offences, which 
is or would be constituted by the conduct concerned is an offence for which a 
person who has reached the age of 18 . . . and has no previous convictions could 
reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 3 years or 
more [or where] the conduct involves use of violence, results in substantial 
financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common 
purpose.” See IPA, supra note 23, § 263(1). 
171 Id. c. 25. 
172 See Carey, supra note 25. 
173 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h). 
174 See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 7(5). 
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1. Bulk Data Collection 
 
Traditionally, one common issue that has constantly been at the 
center of controversy over the UK surveillance laws is the purpose 
of data collections. In the past, certain local authorities had used 
powers granted under RIPA for reasons that are not related to 
national security or terrorism—to monitor dog barking, gather 
evidence against those guilty of feeding pigeons, or checking up on 
government benefit claimants, for example—as the statute itself 
defines as its purpose.175 While these instances happened before the 
enactment of the IPA, which supposedly has more stringent 
requirement and oversight, they illustrate how the surveillance laws 
can be abused without the knowledge of the public. 
In Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger & Others, the CJEU 
struck down the Data Retention Directive of the European Union176 
because the retention of data of citizens violated fundamental rights 
to privacy illustrated in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 177  In its opinion, however, the CJEU did 
acknowledge that preventing and prosecuting “serious crimes” is an 
acceptable justification for collection and retention of data by 
government authorities.178 In response to this judgement, the United 
Kingdom passed DRIPA to provide a legal basis to continuously 
force the CSPs to retain communications data of the citizens. Upon 
its expiration, DRIPA was replaced by the IPA.179 
Under the IPA, in order for law enforcement agencies to obtain 
a warrant for bulk acquisition, the UK Secretary of State must 
                                                 
175 Anushka Asthana, Revealed: British Councils Used RIPA to Secretly Spy 
on Public, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 25, 2016), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/25/british-councils-used-
investigatory-powers-ripa-to-secretly-spy-on-public. 
176 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection 
with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or 
of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 
O.J. (L 105). 
177 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger 
& Others, 2014 E.C.R. 238. 
178 Id. ¶ 102. 
179  David Fennelly, Data Retention: the Life, Death and Afterlife of a 
Directive, J. ACAD. OF EUR. L. 673, 685 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-
018-0516-5. 
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approve the warrant with a belief that the warrant is (1) in the interest 
of national security, (2) for the purpose of preventing or detecting 
serious crime, or (3) in the interest of economic well-being of the 
United Kingdom as long as it relates to the interests of national 
security. 180  The Secretary also needs to consider whether the 
collection authorized by the warrant is proportionate to the purpose 
it is sought to achieve. 181  Then, the judicial commission must 
approve the warrant. In doing so, the commission is to determine 
whether the warrant satisfies any of the three purposes mentioned 
above as well as whether the scope of the warrant is proportionate 
to what is sought to achieve.182 
However, the IPA itself does not indicate which factors must be 
taken into account in making such decisions, and, thus, provides 
ample room for discretion of the Secretary. 183 For example, it does 
not clarify what constitutes as “interest of national security” or 
“economic well-being.” 184  This allows for much leeway in 
validating an issuance of a warrant and broad inclusion of data to be 
collected.185 In addition, the purposes identified by agencies in order 
to obtain a warrant is, by its inherent nature, confidential.186 As a 
result, it will be difficult to examine what exactly were the reasons 
cited in their requests for warrants permitting bulk data collection.  
To be sure, the language of “national interest” and “serious 
crime” is almost identical to the limitations set by the Executive 
Agreement.187 But, assuming that bulk collection of data inevitably 
exposes communications data that belong to U.S. citizens, the UK 
government’s request for disclosure from U.S.-based CSPs may 
                                                 
180 See IPA, supra note 23, c. 25, §§ 158(1), (2). 
181  Id. A comprehensive list of valid operational purposes shared by the 
government shows broad spectrum of purposes that may potentially qualify for 
issuance of such warrant. See Operational Case for Bulk Powers, GCHQ, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/504187/Operational_Case_for_Bulk_Powers.pdf. 
182 See IPA, supra note 23, c. 25, §§ 23, 140, 159. 
183 See Waranch, supra note 161, at 227. 
184 Id. at 231.  
185 Id. at 233. 
186 Id. at 234. 
187 See supra note 82. 
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violate the data privacy of U.S. citizens since the disclosure is 
governed by the UK laws, only.188 
 
2. Judicial Standard of Reasonable Justification 
 
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment is the primary 
safeguard against the government’s investigatory power.189 In the 
context of electronic evidence, the U.S. government needs to obtain 
a judicial warrant in order to collect relevant data from the CSPs. 
The government has the burden of proving “probable cause” in front 
of the FISC to obtain approval.190  
For the United Kingdom, the most equivalent legal safeguard 
against intrusion of privacy is Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which states that privacy is a fundamental human 
right.191 Article 8 is also the basis on which the CJEU ruled against 
parts of the UK’s surveillance regime in Big Brother Watch and 
Others v. United Kingdom.192 While the Court in Big Brother Watch 
did not assess the IPA directly, it found that bulk interception of 
communications and obtainment of data from the CSPs by the UK 
government violated the Article.193 One of the reasons cited was the 
insufficient oversight of such collection by the UK Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal.194 
The CLOUD Act and the Executive Agreement only require that 
the UK courts find “reasonable justification” that the disclosure of 
data from the CSPs is warranted. 195  Because both documents 
recognize that only the UK laws will govern the procedure in the 
                                                 
188 See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 3(2). 
189 See Gonzalez, supra note 10, at 23. 
190 See supra note 148. 
191 European Court of Human Rights on Guide on Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Aug. 31, 2019), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf. 
192 Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, 299 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
__ (2018), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-
6187848-8026299%22]}. 
193 Id. at 3-4. 
194  Sean Gallagher, “Bulk Interception” by GCHQ (and NSA) Violated 
Human Rights Charter, European Court Rules, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/09/bulk-interception-by-gchq-and-nsa-
violated-human-rights-charter-european-court-rules/. 
195 U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 5(1), (2). 
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United Kingdom, probable cause standard required by the Fourth 
Amendment will play no role in the issuance of judicial order by the 
UK authorities. As mentioned above, the IPC needs to consider 
whether the warrant signed by the Secretary of State is related to 
acceptable and legitimate objectives and the collection of data is 
proportionate to achieving that goal.196 In doing so, the IPC will 
most likely adopt the reasonable justification standard set by UK 
courts,197 which has a lower burden of proof than the probable cause 
standard.198 This lack of protection under the Fourth Amendment 
will increase the possibility of incidental collection of U.S. citizens’ 
data in the process of collecting that of targeted UK citizens by the 
UK government. 
 
III. ADOPTING EU STANDARDS AND INCREASING CSPS’ ROLES 
 
While it is clear that incidental collection of data is a problem 
that the lawmakers were aware of, neither the CLOUD Act nor the 
Executive Agreement indicates any specific solution to prevent the 
collection of such data in the first place. On the other hand, 
recognizing privacy as one of the fundamental rights, the EU has 
been at the forefront of developing strong data protection laws 
globally.199 This Part looks at the legal regime implemented by the 
EU to ensure the protection of consumer data, and how a similar 
approach could fill in the gap.  
To this end, Section III.A highlights transferrable aspects of 
approaches taken by the European bloc. It should be noted that while 
adopting some of the approaches taken by the bloc would make the 
data transfer between the United States and the United Kingdom 
safer in theory, this will be easier said than done due to differences 
in laws and policies of the EU and the United States. For instance, 
the EU recognizes its citizens’ Right to be Forgotten while it lacks 
                                                 
196 See IPA, supra note 23, c. 25, §§ 23, 140, 159. 
197 Id., c. 25, § 23(2)(a) (“In deciding whether to approve a [warrant under the 
IPA,] the Judicial Commissioner must—(a) apply the same principles as would 
be applied by a court on an application for judicial review. . .”). 
198  See Gonzalez, supra note 10 (arguing that the tests used by the 
Investigatory Powers Commission in its proportionality assessment of warrant for 
decryption under the Investigatory Powers Act is a low bar). 
199 See ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION 
RULES THE WORLD 131-170 (2020). 
35
Kim: U.S.-U.K. Executive Agreement: Case Study of Incidental Collectio
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2020
282 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:3 
 
the Fourth Amendment rights protected by the U.S. Constitution. 
Another difference between the two is each entity’s treatment of 
data privacy: in the United States, it is treated as a transferrable 
commodity whereas the EU considers data privacy to be a 
fundamental human right.200 
Thus, Section III.B discusses alternative, and perhaps 
complementary, methods to achieve the same goal: the increased 
role of the private sector, namely the CSPs. That Section will focus 
on how they may also contribute to the protection of data privacy of 
U.S. Citizens when data transfers are executed under the CLOUD 
Act and the Executive Agreement. This may require some 
modification of the two, which also will not come easily. However, 
as seen from the CSPs support of the CLOUD Act in the first place, 
it seems that they would be willing to take more of an active role, 
making it a possible solution.201 
 
A.  Legislative Amendments in Reference to the GDPR 
 
Few would question the relatively dominating role of the EU in 
shaping the data privacy laws around the globe. It is said that this 
effect is likely to continue for some time despite the steady decreases 
in the EU’s market share in the digital economy with the rise of other 
countries such as China and India.202 Section III.A.1 looks at how 
the CLOUD Act may be amended to include increased oversight in 
the process of evaluating candidate countries and determining 
whether they qualify for executive agreements. In doing so, that 
Section discusses the procedures taken by the EU in evaluating 
candidacy for Adequacy Decisions under the GDPR. 203  Also 
                                                 
200 See id. 
201 See Support for the CLOUD Act of 2018, MICROSOFT (Apr. 11, 2018) 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/wp-content/uploads/prod/sites/5/2018/04/Support-
for-the-CLOUD-Act-of-2018_4.11.18.pdf. 
202 See BRADFORD, supra note 199. 
203 To be sure, the CLOUD Act deals with cross-border data transfers for the 
purpose of criminal investigation, while the Adequacy Decisions—which deals 
with personal data transfer for commercial purposes—do not. However, because 
this Section looks at the procedures taken before the Adequacy Decision is 
granted to another country, this difference has no significance. Emphasis is given 
to the symmetry of the purposes behind Adequacy Decisions and the CLOUD Act 
to ease transfer of private data without additional procedure and authorization. 
36
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol15/iss3/5
2020] U.S.-UK EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT 283 
 
looking at the corresponding Articles in the GDPR, Section III.A.2 
proposes legislative amendments to the CLOUD Act which may 
provide rights to remedy and to file a complaint under the statute to 
private persons. 
1. Amending the Process of Evaluating QFGs 
 
Article 45 of the GDPR addresses the Adequacy Decisions, a 
method allowed under the Regulation through which private entities 
can transfer personal information of data subjects to other countries 
or international organizations.204 Foreign countries seek Adequacy 
Decisions from the EU which, if granted, allow businesses operating 
in both countries to transfer commercial data beyond their borders 
with ease. Before granting an affirmative decision, the bloc goes 
through a rigorous process of evaluating the adequacy of privacy 
protection laws in candidate countries.205  
For example, the European Commission issued an Adequacy 
Decision with Japan in January 2019.206 The final adoption came 
only after the Japanese government’s adoption of Supplementary 
Rules which enhanced the country’s existing privacy laws to 
provide as robust data protection as the GDPR.207 As of this writing, 
the EU has a similar ongoing negotiation with the Republic of Korea 
(Korea). Korea sought Adequacy Decisions with the EU in 2015, 
but the European Commission flagged the inadequate independence 
of the relevant enforcement bodies.208 More specifically, under the 
                                                 
204 See GDPR, art. 45. 
205 EUR. COMM’N., Digital Single Market – Communications on Exchanging 
and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World Questions and Answers (Jan. 
10, 2017) (“An adequacy decision is a decision taken by the Commission 
establishing that a third country provides a comparable level of protection of 
personal data to that in the European Union, through its domestic law or its 
international commitments. As a result, personal data can flow from the [EU] to 
that third country, without being subject to any further safeguards or 
authorisations.”). 
206 Věra Jourová, EUR. COMM’N., EU Japan Adequacy Decision (Jan. 2019). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/research_and_innovation/law_and_regul
ations/documents/adequacy-japan-factsheet_en_2019_1.pdf. 
207See id.; see also EUR. COMM’N., International Data Flows: Commission 
Launches the Adoption of its Adequacy Decision on Japan (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5433. 
208  David Meyer, South Korea’s EU Adequacy Decision Rests on New 
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Korean data protection law, the Personal Information Protection 
Act, the enforcement power lied with the Ministry of Interior and 
Safety. 209  The most recent amendment passed in the peninsular 
country on January 9, 2020, was specifically aimed at successfully 
obtaining an Adequacy Decision from the EU by creating an 
independent agency.210  
The EU has adopted adequacy decisions for the following 
countries and territories: Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faeroe 
Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, Uruguay, and Japan.211  Currently, there is a partial 
Adequacy Decision granted by the EU for the United States, 
meaning only some data may be transferred between the two 
countries under limited circumstances.212 In assessing the adequacy 
of the data protection laws of a country, the European Commission 
looks at similar elements that the U.S. Attorney General is to 
consider under the CLOUD Act in evaluating foreign governments 
as candidates for an executive agreement. Some similar elements 
are, among others, laws protecting human rights and privacy, and 
clear procedures to achieve this objective.213 
However, one clear distinction is that the process of evaluating 
a foreign country’s privacy laws and ultimately adopting Adequacy 
                                                 
Legislative Proposal, IAPP (Nov. 27, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/south-
koreas-eu-adequacy-decision-rests-on-new-legislative-proposals/.  
209 Articles 52 and 53 of the GDPR requires an independent supervisory 
authority within the country that seeks Adequacy Decision from the EU. Id. 
210  Personal Information Protection Commission, 2019 Annual Report: 
Personal Information Protection in Korea, 131-32 (Aug. 30, 2019), 
http://www.pipc.go.kr/ebook/y201908/index.html (S. Korea). 
211 Adequacy Decisions: How the EU Determines if a Non-EU Country has 
an Adequate Level of Data Protection, EUR. COMM’N., 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-
data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en. 
212 This limitation is due to the EU’s stance that there are some parts of the 
data privacy law in the United States that are inadequate. See EUR. COMM’N., 
supra note 205(“The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework is a ‘partial’ adequacy 
decision, as , in the absence of general data protection law in the U.S., only the 
companies committing to abiding by the binding Privacy Shield principles benefit 
from easier data transfers.”).  
213 For non-exhaustive elements that must be considered by the European 
Commission in assessing the adequacy of the level of data protection of a 
prospective country, see GDPR, art. 45(2)(a). 
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Decisions involves relatively more inputs from other independent 
authorities. The process involves (1) a proposal from the European 
Commission with (2) reference to an opinion of the EDPB which 
consists of one representative from each Member State pursuant to 
Article 68 of the GDPR, (3) approval by representatives of the 
Member States, and, finally, (4) the adoption decision by the 
European Commission.214 By contrast, the CLOUD Act explicitly 
states that the Attorney General’s final determination will not be 
subject to any judicial or administrative review.215 To be sure, under 
the CLOUD Act, the Attorney General’s evaluation of a QFG and 
the final executive agreement is subject to review by Congress.216 
But the statute, which does not require affirmative approval of the 
Legislative branch but rather only mandates that Congress object if 
unsatisfied, fails to elaborate what would happen if Congress does 
not review the executive agreements. 217  In that scenario, the 
Executive Branch would be the de facto sole determiner of 
qualifying governments. 
The authority to evaluate a foreign government could also be 
given to an independent authority in addition to the Attorney 
General. At minimum, an independent agency or a committee 
should have the authority to approve or disapprove the decision of 
the Attorney General. This would decrease the possibility of the 
United States entering into an executive agreement with a foreign 
government whose data protection laws are inadequate to minimize 
the incidental collection or abuse of data of U.S. citizens, and, thus, 
breach of their privacy. 
 
2. Cause of Action and Remedy for Private Persons 
 
As it stands currently, the Executive Agreement does not give 
rise to any right or remedy on the part of private persons. 218 
                                                 
214 See EUR. COMM’N., supra note 211. 
215  See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(c) (“Limitation on Judicial Review—A 
determination or certification made by the Attorney General under subjection (b) 
shall not be subject to judicial or administrative review.”). 
216 See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)(4). 
217 See id. 
218  See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 3(4) (“The 
provisions of this Agreement shall not give rise to a right or remedy on the part of 
any private person, including to obtain, suppress or exclude any evidence, or to 
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Incorporation of provisions similar to Chapter VIII of the GDPR 
would invoke additional efforts by the CSPs and the QFG to ensure 
that collection of U.S. citizens’ data does not occur. Simply put, 
Chapter VIII of the GDPR grants data subjects the right to file a 
complaint under the Regulation to seek judicial remedies against the 
government entities and the CSPs in cases of data breach.219 If the 
data subjects suffered damages, the CSPs will also have to 
compensate the victims,220 and any other infringement may subject 
the CSPs to administrative fines221 as well as penalties under the 
laws of the Member States.222  
The CLOUD Act and the Executive Agreement should be 
modified to carve out instances that give cause of action to U.S. 
citizens when their data has been incidentally collected. Of course, 
to be compatible with the Executive Agreement, the right should not 
be exercised to obstruct criminal investigations. Further amendment 
should provide for remedies ex post so that the requesting QFG and 
the CSPs would be more cautious in identifying the data that belongs 
to U.S. citizens. 
Similarly, the Executive Agreement and the CLOUD Act could 
be further amended to impose obligations on the CSPs to take 
sufficient efforts to ensure that U.S. citizens’ data is not sent to the 
QFGs, and, if any material data belong to U.S. citizens are 
identified, to take adequate steps to quash or modify the motion 
pursuant to the Agreement. Enforcing fines and penalties to 
inadequate measures taken by CSPs when they reasonably knew or 
should have known the inclusion of U.S. citizens data in their 
transfers may also provide additional safeguards. 
 
B.  Increasing the Role of the CSPs 
 
Another solution is to have the CSPs take more active roles in 
data collection under the CLOUD Act and executive agreements. 
Neither the CLOUD Act nor the Executive Agreement requires the 
                                                 
impede the execution of Legal Process.”). 
219 See GDPR, art. 77, 78, 79. 
220 Id. art. 82. 
221 Id. art. 83. 
222 Id. art. 84.  
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CSPs to comply with requests of data by the UK authorities.223 At 
the same time, they do not require the CSPs to take any additional 
measures to safeguard the data of U.S. citizens. Adopting some of 
the specific requirements the CSPs must abide by under the GDPR 
into the executive agreements or the CLOUD Act may provide 
additional protection of U.S. citizens’ privacy. Section III.B.1 
proposes requiring the CSPs to provide notifications to the 
consumers in instances of privacy breach via incidental collection. 
Section III.B.2 proposes implementing procedures under which the 
CSPs could file Motions to Quash and/or Modify judicial orders 
granted by foreign courts with less stringent standard if potentiality 
of incidental collection is identified. 
  
1. Notification Obligation 
 
Article 7 of the GDPR requires the CSPs to obtain explicit 
consent from the users in terms of how their data is processed.224 At 
least with respect to U.S. citizens who are identified to be using 
services from the U.S.-based CSPs, the providers should be required 
to explicitly disclose that their data is not to be collected by the 
foreign authorities. While doing so, the CSPs could ask for consent 
were this to be the case for the purposes identified in the underlying 
executive agreements. This would be the simplest and the easiest 
way to solve the problem of incidental collection, for the collection 
would have been agreed upon by the U.S. citizens ex ante. However, 
it is unlikely that many U.S. persons would agree to have their 
private information exposed. Taking this step, nonetheless, would at 
least inform the users of the possibility of incidental collection of 
their data and increase awareness of the problem. 
Currently, the CLOUD Act does not create any obligation on the 
CSPs to take such action, but they are subject to the domestic law of 
the QFG.225 This means, for example, the CSPs have no obligation 
to notify the U.S. citizens’ whose data has been collected by the UK 
government unless the UK law requires such notification. An 
                                                 
223  See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(iii); see also U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive 
Agreement, supra note 28, art. 6(3). 
224 See GDPR, art. 7. 
225The Purpose and Impact of the CLOUD Act – FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1153466/download. 
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obligation can be imposed upon the CSPs to notify the U.S. citizens 
when their data has been transferred to a QFG. If enforced, such 
requirements would parallel Article 19 and Article 34 of the GDPR. 
Article 19 requires the CSPs, upon request by the data subjects, to 
inform the consumers of the recipients of their data.226 By contrast, 
under Article 34, the CSPs have affirmative obligation to notify to 
the data subjects if their data has been breached.227 Combining these 
rules, the CSPs can be required to provide detailed notification when 
consumer data has been transferred to a QFG under the executive 
agreement. While this obligation by itself may not prevent all 
incidental collections, in conjunction with other remedies mentioned 
above, it will increase the role of the CSPs in making sure the data 
requested by, and transferred to, QFGs do not include personal 
information of U.S. citizens. 
 
2. Objection to Search Warrants 
 
The CLOUD Act allows the CSPs to file a motion to quash or 
modify a search warrant if they reasonably believe that disclosure of 
requested data would violate the laws of a QFG.228 However, the 
language of the statute suggests that this only applies to CSPs move 
to modify or quash judicial orders in the United States.229 The only 
other provision that seems to apply to Motions to Modify or Quash 
judicial orders in a foreign court is 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which 
allows the court  to grant such motion “if the information or records 
requested are unusually voluminous” or “compliance with such 
                                                 
226 See GDPR, art. 19. 
227 Id. art. 34. 
228  See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2)(A)(ii); see also supra notes 77-80 and 
accompanying texts. 
229 The relevant provisions do not specify whether they are referring to courts 
in the United States or in the QFGs. See generally id. § 2703(h)(2). But the CSPs 
must show that the consumer is not a U.S. person, and, thus, the request is 
inappropriate—which would be the case only if the judicial order was obtained 
by the United States to obtain data of a non-U.S. person. Moreover, the provisions 
on comity analysis directs the court with such motion to take into consideration 
“the interest of the United States,” id. § 2703(h)(3)(A), and “the interests of the 
[QFG] in preventing any prohibited disclosure.” Id. § 2703(h)(3)(B). Therefore, 
the only provision in the CLOUD Act that speaks to Motions to Modify or Quash 
search warrant seems to apply in U.S. courts only. 
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order otherwise would cause an undue burden on [the CSPs].”230 
The Executive Agreement merely states that the CSPs may make 
objections to the UK government “when it has reasonable belief that 
the Agreement may not be properly invoked with regards to the 
[search warrant]” upon issuance of the order for disclosure.231 No 
other relevant detail is present in the document.  
In theory, a U.S.-based CSP should be able to object to the 
search warrants issued by the UK authorities given that it believes 
that the order does not meet the requirements set by the CLOUD Act 
and the Executive Agreement. However, the likelihood of success is 
questionable, especially given the lack of specificity as to how 
foreign courts should deal with such objections. As discussed, 
persons in the United Kingdom do not enjoy the equivalent 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, satisfaction of a 
reasonable justification standard by the UK authorities is sufficient 
to issue an order. And because only the UK laws apply according to 
the Executive Agreement,232 the CSPs will not be able to object to 
the issued order even if they believe that there is no probable cause 
for the order. To be clear, this would not be a problem if only the 
data of UK citizens are requested. But when there are possibilities 
that data belonging to U.S. citizens may also be collected, and even 
if the CSPs are aware of such possibilities, there is no ground for 
objection under the current statute and the Executive Agreement 
since both documents only refer to intentionally targeted persons 
who are, presumably, the UK citizens.233 
It is less realistic to force the probable cause standard onto all 
the warrants issued by the UK authorities. But it may be possible to 
enforce such standard when data belonging to U.S. persons is 
involved. One solution is to allow for review by the U.S. authorities 
early on in the process if the CSPs can show that the disclosure of 
data of the targeted UK person would also include that of U.S. 
persons. A creation of a separate procedure may allow an 
independent authority within the U.S. government to review the 
order, for example. But there is an uneasy possibility that this 
additional step might defeat the original purpose of the CLOUD Act 
                                                 
230 Id. § 2703(d). 
231 U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 5(11).  
232 See id. art. 3(2). 
233 See id. art. 4(3); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (b)(4)(A). 
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which is to reduce the time lag behind the transfer of data for 
criminal investigation. Still, at a minimum, the CSPs should be 
allowed to communicate to the UK and the U.S. governments 
regarding the extent to which U.S. persons’ data is integrated with 
that of the targeted person.  
Additionally, the language in the CLOUD Act may be amended 
to permit the CSPs to object to judicial orders of QFGs by adopting 
similar provisions regarding the requirements of Motion to Modify 
or Quash in the United States. This way, in the United Kingdom, for 
example, a CSP could object to UK court orders if it reasonably 
believes that the targeted person is not a UK citizen, does not reside 
in the United Kingdom, and if the disclosure would violate US laws. 
Thus, the Fourth Amendment will come into play. The UK 
authorities would be forced to use caution when requesting certain 
data from the CSPs in order to avoid invoking any objections, which 
comes with the risk of delaying the investigation process. This will 
permit the CSPs with more avenues to take an active role in 
protecting the consumer data from unlawful disclosure by 
effectively enforcing the probable cause standard. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The CLOUD Act, as part of a larger omnibus bill, was passed 
within three-weeks after the Supreme Court heard the arguments 
from the parties in Microsoft. In doing so, Congress implied that 
protecting privacy comes second to expediting criminal 
investigations processes. This is further supported by the fact that 
the United Kingdom is the first country to have entered into an 
executive agreement, given the strength of UK laws’ protection for 
privacy, or rather, lack thereof.  
To protect the privacy of the U.S. citizens while also fulfilling 
the primary purpose behind the CLOUD Act, clarifying clear 
standards to be applied in evaluating a foreign government’s 
candidacy is essential. Alternatively, an independent authority may 
be created to provide input in determining whether a prospective 
foreign government satisfies the elements laid out in the CLOUD 
Act. Furthermore, legislative actions can create additional avenues 
for relief to U.S. citizens whose privacy has been breached. Lastly, 
the CSPs can also play an active role in protecting consumer data by 
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requiring them to implement similar notification procedures and 
providing specific grounds for them to object to a QFG’s request for 
data. 
Looking forward, without additional safeguards discussed here, 
the European country’s arguably less robust privacy laws may 
become the new standard to be met by other potential QFGs. In other 
words, another foreign country with a minimal data protection 
regime may qualify for an executive agreement as long as its privacy 
laws is as strong as those of the United Kingdom. This does not seem 
to be a high bar, taking into consideration the EU’s refusal to declare 
that the country is eligible for an Adequacy Decision “by default” 
upon its exit from the bloc. 234 This implies that even the EU cannot 
confidently say that the UK data protection laws as they stand 
currently meets the higher standards set by the GDPR. If the UK 
privacy laws become the norm, the United States may be further 
behind its competitors as other countries introduce increasingly 
robust privacy laws to attract businesses and gain market share in 
the digital economy.  
To be sure, the primary purpose of the CLOUD Act, which is to 
smooth the cross-border data transfer for criminal investigation 
purposes, is noble and crucial, especially today when the rate at 
which the digital economy is growing overwhelmingly outpaces that 
of its regulations. As of this writing, the Congressional review 
period required under the CLOUD Act of the Executive Agreement 
                                                 
234  UK sent “chilling” warning over EU Adequacy Decision, GDPR 
ASSOCIATES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.gdpr.associates/uk-sent-chilling-
warning-eu-adequacy-decision/; see also Cameron Abbott, Post-Brexit Data 
Protection – Where Are We Now?, THE NAT’L. L. REV. (Feb. 4, 2020) 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/post-brexit-data-protection-where-are-
we-now; David Cowan, GDPR Regime Emerges as Early Candidate for Post-
Brexit Divergence, THE GLOB. LEGAL POST (Feb. 4, 2020) 
http://www.globallegalpost.com/big-stories/gdpr-regime-emerges-as-early-
candidate-for-post-brexit-divergence-460121/ (reporting that the United 
Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said that the country will “not be 
aligning with EU rules.”). 
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has not lapsed yet. 235  While there is little doubt that Executive 
Agreement will go unchallenged by the Legislature, this Article 
identifies potential problems regarding data privacy that should be 
considered regardless of whether the Executive Agreement is 
approved or not. To be clear, the problems identified in this Article 
are only the tip, if that, of myriad issues and uncertainties 
surrounding cross-border data transfer. At the minimum, this Article 
emphasizes that it is difficult to balance the importance of data 
privacy and that of criminal prosecutions. But this balancing must 
be taken with careful consideration and scrutiny when implementing 
a new data protection regime today.  
                                                 
235 On January 16, 2020, Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd sent a 
letter to Congress stating that, while the Executive Agreement was entered into in 
October 2019, because the Department of Justice failed to notify the Congress 
until January 10, 2020 due to “clerical error . . . [DOJ] considers July 8, 2020 to 
be the date upon which the agreement will enter into force, absent the enactment 
into law of a resolution of disapproval as set forth under [18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)].” 
Supplementary Letter from Assistant Att’y Gen. Stephen E. Boyd to U.S. 
Congress in Support of U.S.-U.K. CLOUD Act Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1236281/download. 
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